6 Best Bitcoin Desktop Wallets in 2020 Reviewed (Mac ...
Binance Coin Wallet (BNB) Best BNB Wallet Atomic Wallet
7 Best Litecoin Wallets (LTC Wallet) in 2020
9 Most Secure Bitcoin Wallets and ... - Blocks Decoded
Binance Coin Wallet - Top Binance Coin (BNB) Wallets in 2020
Bitcoin Konto eröffnen Einfach zum richtigen Wallet!
Best Binance Coin Wallets You Should Consider UseTheBitcoin
Brief Comments on Goguen: Q4 2020, Q1 2021, utility, Marlowe, DSL, Glow, Plutus, IELE, smart contracts, thanksgiving to you, sidechains and Hydra, Goguen rollout and additions to product update
Summary: Everyone knows that when you give your assets to someone else, they always keep them safe. If this is true for individuals, it is certainly true for businesses. Custodians always tell the truth and manage funds properly. They won't have any interest in taking the assets as an exchange operator would. Auditors tell the truth and can't be misled. That's because organizations that are regulated are incapable of lying and don't make mistakes. First, some background. Here is a summary of how custodians make us more secure: Previously, we might give Alice our crypto assets to hold. There were risks:
Alice might take the assets and disappear.
Alice might spend the assets and pretend that she still has them (fractional model).
Alice might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Alice might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Alice might lose access to the assets.
But "no worries", Alice has a custodian named Bob. Bob is dressed in a nice suit. He knows some politicians. And he drives a Porsche. "So you have nothing to worry about!". And look at all the benefits we get:
Alice can't take the assets and disappear (unless she asks Bob or never gives them to Bob).
Alice can't spend the assets and pretend that she still has them. (Unless she didn't give them to Bob or asks him for them.)
Alice can't store the assets insecurely so they get stolen. (After all - she doesn't have any control over the withdrawal process from any of Bob's systems, right?)
Alice can't give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force. (Bob will stop her, right Bob?)
Alice can't lose access to the funds. (She'll always be present, sane, and remember all secrets, right?)
See - all problems are solved! All we have to worry about now is:
Bob might take the assets and disappear.
Bob might spend the assets and pretend that he still has them (fractional model).
Bob might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Bob might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Bob might lose access to the assets.
It's pretty simple. Before we had to trust Alice. Now we only have to trust Alice, Bob, and all the ways in which they communicate. Just think of how much more secure we are! "On top of that", Bob assures us, "we're using a special wallet structure". Bob shows Alice a diagram. "We've broken the balance up and store it in lots of smaller wallets. That way", he assures her, "a thief can't take it all at once". And he points to a historic case where a large sum was taken "because it was stored in a single wallet... how stupid". "Very early on, we used to have all the crypto in one wallet", he said, "and then one Christmas a hacker came and took it all. We call him the Grinch. Now we individually wrap each crypto and stick it under a binary search tree. The Grinch has never been back since." "As well", Bob continues, "even if someone were to get in, we've got insurance. It covers all thefts and even coercion, collusion, and misplaced keys - only subject to the policy terms and conditions." And with that, he pulls out a phone-book sized contract and slams it on the desk with a thud. "Yep", he continues, "we're paying top dollar for one of the best policies in the country!" "Can I read it?' Alice asks. "Sure," Bob says, "just as soon as our legal team is done with it. They're almost through the first chapter." He pauses, then continues. "And can you believe that sales guy Mike? He has the same year Porsche as me. I mean, what are the odds?" "Do you use multi-sig?", Alice asks. "Absolutely!" Bob replies. "All our engineers are fully trained in multi-sig. Whenever we want to set up a new wallet, we generate 2 separate keys in an air-gapped process and store them in this proprietary system here. Look, it even requires the biometric signature from one of our team members to initiate any withdrawal." He demonstrates by pressing his thumb into the display. "We use a third-party cloud validation API to match the thumbprint and authorize each withdrawal. The keys are also backed up daily to an off-site third-party." "Wow that's really impressive," Alice says, "but what if we need access for a withdrawal outside of office hours?" "Well that's no issue", Bob says, "just send us an email, call, or text message and we always have someone on staff to help out. Just another part of our strong commitment to all our customers!" "What about Proof of Reserve?", Alice asks. "Of course", Bob replies, "though rather than publish any blockchain addresses or signed transaction, for privacy we just do a SHA256 refactoring of the inverse hash modulus for each UTXO nonce and combine the smart contract coefficient consensus in our hyperledger lightning node. But it's really simple to use." He pushes a button and a large green checkmark appears on a screen. "See - the algorithm ran through and reserves are proven." "Wow", Alice says, "you really know your stuff! And that is easy to use! What about fiat balances?" "Yeah, we have an auditor too", Bob replies, "Been using him for a long time so we have quite a strong relationship going! We have special books we give him every year and he's very efficient! Checks the fiat, crypto, and everything all at once!" "We used to have a nice offline multi-sig setup we've been using without issue for the past 5 years, but I think we'll move all our funds over to your facility," Alice says. "Awesome", Bob replies, "Thanks so much! This is perfect timing too - my Porsche got a dent on it this morning. We have the paperwork right over here." "Great!", Alice replies. And with that, Alice gets out her pen and Bob gets the contract. "Don't worry", he says, "you can take your crypto-assets back anytime you like - just subject to our cancellation policy. Our annual management fees are also super low and we don't adjust them often". How many holes have to exist for your funds to get stolen? Just one. Why are we taking a powerful offline multi-sig setup, widely used globally in hundreds of different/lacking regulatory environments with 0 breaches to date, and circumventing it by a demonstrably weak third party layer? And paying a great expense to do so? If you go through the list of breaches in the past 2 years to highly credible organizations, you go through the list of major corporate frauds (only the ones we know about), you go through the list of all the times platforms have lost funds, you go through the list of times and ways that people have lost their crypto from identity theft, hot wallet exploits, extortion, etc... and then you go through this custodian with a fine-tooth comb and truly believe they have value to add far beyond what you could, sticking your funds in a wallet (or set of wallets) they control exclusively is the absolute worst possible way to take advantage of that security. The best way to add security for crypto-assets is to make a stronger multi-sig. With one custodian, what you are doing is giving them your cryptocurrency and hoping they're honest, competent, and flawlessly secure. It's no different than storing it on a really secure exchange. Maybe the insurance will cover you. Didn't work for Bitpay in 2015. Didn't work for Yapizon in 2017. Insurance has never paid a claim in the entire history of cryptocurrency. But maybe you'll get lucky. Maybe your exact scenario will buck the trend and be what they're willing to cover. After the large deductible and hopefully without a long and expensive court battle. And you want to advertise this increase in risk, the lapse of judgement, an accident waiting to happen, as though it's some kind of benefit to customers ("Free institutional-grade storage for your digital assets.")? And then some people are writing to the OSC that custodians should be mandatory for all funds on every exchange platform? That this somehow will make Canadians as a whole more secure or better protected compared with standard air-gapped multi-sig? On what planet? Most of the problems in Canada stemmed from one thing - a lack of transparency. If Canadians had known what a joke Quadriga was - it wouldn't have grown to lose $400m from hard-working Canadians from coast to coast to coast. And Gerald Cotten would be in jail, not wherever he is now (at best, rotting peacefully). EZ-BTC and mister Dave Smilie would have been a tiny little scam to his friends, not a multi-million dollar fraud. Einstein would have got their act together or been shut down BEFORE losing millions and millions more in people's funds generously donated to criminals. MapleChange wouldn't have even been a thing. And maybe we'd know a little more about CoinTradeNewNote - like how much was lost in there. Almost all of the major losses with cryptocurrency exchanges involve deception with unbacked funds. So it's great to see transparency reports from BitBuy and ShakePay where someone independently verified the backing. The only thing we don't have is:
ANY CERTAINTY BALANCES WEREN'T EXCLUDED. Quadriga's largest account was $70m. 80% of funds are in 20% of accounts (Pareto principle). All it takes is excluding a few really large accounts - and nobody's the wiser. A fractional platform can easily pass any audit this way.
ANY VISIBILITY WHATSOEVER INTO THE CUSTODIANS. BitBuy put out their report before moving all the funds to their custodian and ShakePay apparently can't even tell us who the custodian is. That's pretty important considering that basically all of the funds are now stored there.
ANY IDEA ABOUT THE OTHER EXCHANGES. In order for this to be effective, it has to be the norm. It needs to be "unusual" not to know. If obscurity is the norm, then it's super easy for people like Gerald Cotten and Dave Smilie to blend right in.
It's not complicated to validate cryptocurrency assets. They need to exist, they need to be spendable, and they need to cover the total balances. There are plenty of credible people and firms across the country that have the capacity to reasonably perform this validation. Having more frequent checks by different, independent, parties who publish transparent reports is far more valuable than an annual check by a single "more credible/official" party who does the exact same basic checks and may or may not publish anything. Here's an example set of requirements that could be mandated:
First report within 1 month of launching, another within 3 months, and further reports at minimum every 6 months thereafter.
No auditor can be repeated within a 12 month period.
All reports must be public, identifying the auditor and the full methodology used.
All auditors must be independent of the firm being audited with no conflict of interest.
Reports must include the percentage of each asset backed, and how it's backed.
The auditor publishes a hash list, which lists a hash of each customer's information and balances that were included. Hash is one-way encryption so privacy is fully preserved. Every customer can use this to have 100% confidence they were included.
If we want more extensive requirements on audits, these should scale upward based on the total assets at risk on the platform, and whether the platform has loaned their assets out.
There are ways to structure audits such that neither crypto assets nor customer information are ever put at risk, and both can still be properly validated and publicly verifiable. There are also ways to structure audits such that they are completely reasonable for small platforms and don't inhibit innovation in any way. By making the process as reasonable as possible, we can completely eliminate any reason/excuse that an honest platform would have for not being audited. That is arguable far more important than any incremental improvement we might get from mandating "the best of the best" accountants. Right now we have nothing mandated and tons of Canadians using offshore exchanges with no oversight whatsoever. Transparency does not prove crypto assets are safe. CoinTradeNewNote, Flexcoin ($600k), and Canadian Bitcoins ($100k) are examples where crypto-assets were breached from platforms in Canada. All of them were online wallets and used no multi-sig as far as any records show. This is consistent with what we see globally - air-gapped multi-sig wallets have an impeccable record, while other schemes tend to suffer breach after breach. We don't actually know how much CoinTrader lost because there was no visibility. Rather than publishing details of what happened, the co-founder of CoinTrader silently moved on to found another platform - the "most trusted way to buy and sell crypto" - a site that has no information whatsoever (that I could find) on the storage practices and a FAQ advising that “[t]rading cryptocurrency is completely safe” and that having your own wallet is “entirely up to you! You can certainly keep cryptocurrency, or fiat, or both, on the app.” Doesn't sound like much was learned here, which is really sad to see. It's not that complicated or unreasonable to set up a proper hardware wallet. Multi-sig can be learned in a single course. Something the equivalent complexity of a driver's license test could prevent all the cold storage exploits we've seen to date - even globally. Platform operators have a key advantage in detecting and preventing fraud - they know their customers far better than any custodian ever would. The best job that custodians can do is to find high integrity individuals and train them to form even better wallet signatories. Rather than mandating that all platforms expose themselves to arbitrary third party risks, regulations should center around ensuring that all signatories are background-checked, properly trained, and using proper procedures. We also need to make sure that signatories are empowered with rights and responsibilities to reject and report fraud. They need to know that they can safely challenge and delay a transaction - even if it turns out they made a mistake. We need to have an environment where mistakes are brought to the surface and dealt with. Not one where firms and people feel the need to hide what happened. In addition to a knowledge-based test, an auditor can privately interview each signatory to make sure they're not in coercive situations, and we should make sure they can freely and anonymously report any issues without threat of retaliation. A proper multi-sig has each signature held by a separate person and is governed by policies and mutual decisions instead of a hierarchy. It includes at least one redundant signature. For best results, 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. History has demonstrated over and over again the risk of hot wallets even to highly credible organizations. Nonetheless, many platforms have hot wallets for convenience. While such losses are generally compensated by platforms without issue (for example Poloniex, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, Gatecoin, Coincheck, Bithumb, Zaif, CoinBene, Binance, Bitrue, Bitpoint, Upbit, VinDAX, and now KuCoin), the public tends to focus more on cases that didn't end well. Regardless of what systems are employed, there is always some level of risk. For that reason, most members of the public would prefer to see third party insurance. Rather than trying to convince third party profit-seekers to provide comprehensive insurance and then relying on an expensive and slow legal system to enforce against whatever legal loopholes they manage to find each and every time something goes wrong, insurance could be run through multiple exchange operators and regulators, with the shared interest of having a reputable industry, keeping costs down, and taking care of Canadians. For example, a 4 of 7 multi-sig insurance fund held between 5 independent exchange operators and 2 regulatory bodies. All Canadian exchanges could pay premiums at a set rate based on their needed coverage, with a higher price paid for hot wallet coverage (anything not an air-gapped multi-sig cold wallet). Such a model would be much cheaper to manage, offer better coverage, and be much more reliable to payout when needed. The kind of coverage you could have under this model is unheard of. You could even create something like the CDIC to protect Canadians who get their trading accounts hacked if they can sufficiently prove the loss is legitimate. In cases of fraud, gross negligence, or insolvency, the fund can be used to pay affected users directly (utilizing the last transparent balance report in the worst case), something which private insurance would never touch. While it's recommended to have official policies for coverage, a model where members vote would fully cover edge cases. (Could be similar to the Supreme Court where justices vote based on case law.) Such a model could fully protect all Canadians across all platforms. You can have a fiat coverage governed by legal agreements, and crypto-asset coverage governed by both multi-sig and legal agreements. It could be practical, affordable, and inclusive. Now, we are at a crossroads. We can happily give up our freedom, our innovation, and our money. We can pay hefty expenses to auditors, lawyers, and regulators year after year (and make no mistake - this cost will grow to many millions or even billions as the industry grows - and it will be borne by all Canadians on every platform because platforms are not going to eat up these costs at a loss). We can make it nearly impossible for any new platform to enter the marketplace, forcing Canadians to use the same stagnant platforms year after year. We can centralize and consolidate the entire industry into 2 or 3 big players and have everyone else fail (possibly to heavy losses of users of those platforms). And when a flawed security model doesn't work and gets breached, we can make it even more complicated with even more people in suits making big money doing the job that blockchain was supposed to do in the first place. We can build a system which is so intertwined and dependent on big government, traditional finance, and central bankers that it's future depends entirely on that of the fiat system, of fractional banking, and of government bail-outs. If we choose this path, as history has shown us over and over again, we can not go back, save for revolution. Our children and grandchildren will still be paying the consequences of what we decided today. Or, we can find solutions that work. We can maintain an open and innovative environment while making the adjustments we need to make to fully protect Canadian investors and cryptocurrency users, giving easy and affordable access to cryptocurrency for all Canadians on the platform of their choice, and creating an environment in which entrepreneurs and problem solvers can bring those solutions forward easily. None of the above precludes innovation in any way, or adds any unreasonable cost - and these three policies would demonstrably eliminate or resolve all 109 historic cases as studied here - that's every single case researched so far going back to 2011. It includes every loss that was studied so far not just in Canada but globally as well. Unfortunately, finding answers is the least challenging part. Far more challenging is to get platform operators and regulators to agree on anything. My last post got no response whatsoever, and while the OSC has told me they're happy for industry feedback, I believe my opinion alone is fairly meaningless. This takes the whole community working together to solve. So please let me know your thoughts. Please take the time to upvote and share this with people. Please - let's get this solved and not leave it up to other people to do. Facts/background/sources (skip if you like):
The inspiration for the paragraph about splitting wallets was an actual quote from a Canadian company providing custodial services in response to the OSC consultation paper: "We believe that it will be in the in best interests of investors to prohibit pooled crypto assets or ‘floats’. Most Platforms pool assets, citing reasons of practicality and expense. The recent hack of the world’s largest Platform – Binance – demonstrates the vulnerability of participants’ assets when such concessions are made. In this instance, the Platform’s entire hot wallet of Bitcoins, worth over $40 million, was stolen, facilitated in part by the pooling of client crypto assets." "the maintenance of participants (and Platform) crypto assets across multiple wallets distributes the related risk and responsibility of security - reducing the amount of insurance coverage required and making insurance coverage more readily obtainable". For the record, their reply also said nothing whatsoever about multi-sig or offline storage.
In addition to the fact that the $40m hack represented only one "hot wallet" of Binance, and they actually had the vast majority of assets in other wallets (including mostly cold wallets), multiple real cases have clearly demonstrated that risk is still present with multiple wallets. Bitfinex, VinDAX, Bithumb, Altsbit, BitPoint, Cryptopia, and just recently KuCoin all had multiple wallets breached all at the same time, and may represent a significantly larger impact on customers than the Binance breach which was fully covered by Binance. To represent that simply having multiple separate wallets under the same security scheme is a comprehensive way to reduce risk is just not true.
Private insurance has historically never covered a single loss in the cryptocurrency space (at least, not one that I was able to find), and there are notable cases where massive losses were not covered by insurance. Bitpay in 2015 and Yapizon in 2017 both had insurance policies that didn't pay out during the breach, even after a lengthly court process. The same insurance that ShakePay is presently using (and announced to much fanfare) was describe by their CEO himself as covering “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held,” which is something that has never historically happened. As was said with regard to the same policy in 2018 - “I don’t find it surprising that Lloyd’s is in this space,” said Johnson, adding that to his mind the challenge for everybody is figuring out how to structure these policies so that they are actually protective. “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
The most profitable policy for a private insurance company is one with the most expensive premiums that they never have to pay a claim on. They have no inherent incentive to take care of people who lost funds. It's "cheaper" to take the reputational hit and fight the claim in court. The more money at stake, the more the insurance provider is incentivized to avoid payout. They're not going to insure the assets unless they have reasonable certainty to make a profit by doing so, and they're not going to pay out a massive sum unless it's legally forced. Private insurance is always structured to be maximally profitable to the insurance provider.
The circumvention of multi-sig was a key factor in the massive Bitfinex hack of over $60m of bitcoin, which today still sits being slowly used and is worth over $3b. While Bitfinex used a qualified custodian Bitgo, which was and still is active and one of the industry leaders of custodians, and they set up 2 of 3 multi-sig wallets, the entire system was routed through Bitfinex, such that Bitfinex customers could initiate the withdrawals in a "hot" fashion. This feature was also a hit with the hacker. The multi-sig was fully circumvented.
Bitpay in 2015 was another example of a breach that stole 5,000 bitcoins. This happened not through the exploit of any system in Bitpay, but because the CEO of a company they worked with got their computer hacked and the hackers were able to request multiple bitcoin purchases, which Bitpay honoured because they came from the customer's computer legitimately. Impersonation is a very common tactic used by fraudsters, and methods get more extreme all the time.
A notable case in Canada was the Canadian Bitcoins exploit. Funds were stored on a server in a Rogers Data Center, and the attendee was successfully convinced to reboot the server "in safe mode" with a simple phone call, thus bypassing the extensive security and enabling the theft.
The very nature of custodians circumvents multi-sig. This is because custodians are not just having to secure the assets against some sort of physical breach but against any form of social engineering, modification of orders, fraudulent withdrawal attempts, etc... If the security practices of signatories in a multi-sig arrangement are such that the breach risk of one signatory is 1 in 100, the requirement of 3 independent signatures makes the risk of theft 1 in 1,000,000. Since hackers tend to exploit the weakest link, a comparable custodian has to make the entry and exit points of their platform 10,000 times more secure than one of those signatories to provide equivalent protection. And if the signatories beef up their security by only 10x, the risk is now 1 in 1,000,000,000. The custodian has to be 1,000,000 times more secure. The larger and more complex a system is, the more potential vulnerabilities exist in it, and the fewer people can understand how the system works when performing upgrades. Even if a system is completely secure today, one has to also consider how that system might evolve over time or work with different members.
By contrast, offline multi-signature solutions have an extremely solid record, and in the entire history of cryptocurrency exchange incidents which I've studied (listed here), there has only been one incident (796 exchange in 2015) involving an offline multi-signature wallet. It happened because the customer's bitcoin address was modified by hackers, and the amount that was stolen ($230k) was immediately covered by the exchange operators. Basically, the platform operators were tricked into sending a legitimate withdrawal request to the wrong address because hackers exploited their platform to change that address. Such an issue would not be prevented in any way by the use of a custodian, as that custodian has no oversight whatsoever to the exchange platform. It's practical for all exchange operators to test large withdrawal transactions as a general policy, regardless of what model is used, and general best practice is to diagnose and fix such an exploit as soon as it occurs.
False promises on the backing of funds played a huge role in the downfall of Quadriga, and it's been exposed over and over again (MyCoin, PlusToken, Bitsane, Bitmarket, EZBTC, IDAX). Even today, customers have extremely limited certainty on whether their funds in exchanges are actually being backed or how they're being backed. While this issue is not unique to cryptocurrency exchanges, the complexity of the technology and the lack of any regulation or standards makes problems more widespread, and there is no "central bank" to come to the rescue as in the 2008 financial crisis or during the great depression when "9,000 banks failed".
In addition to fraudulent operations, the industry is full of cases where operators have suffered breaches and not reported them. Most recently, Einstein was the largest case in Canada, where ongoing breaches and fraud were perpetrated against the platform for multiple years and nobody found out until the platform collapsed completely. While fraud and breaches suck to deal with, they suck even more when not dealt with. Lack of visibility played a role in the largest downfalls of Mt. Gox, Cryptsy, and Bitgrail. In some cases, platforms are alleged to have suffered a hack and keep operating without admitting it at all, such as CoinBene.
It surprises some to learn that a cryptographic solution has already existed since 2013, and gained widespread support in 2014 after Mt. Gox. Proof of Reserves is a full cryptographic proof that allows any customer using an exchange to have complete certainty that their crypto-assets are fully backed by the platform in real-time. This is accomplished by proving that assets exist on the blockchain, are spendable, and fully cover customer deposits. It does not prove safety of assets or backing of fiat assets.
If we didn't care about privacy at all, a platform could publish their wallet addresses, sign a partial transaction, and put the full list of customer information and balances out publicly. Customers can each check that they are on the list, that the balances are accurate, that the total adds up, and that it's backed and spendable on the blockchain. Platforms who exclude any customer take a risk because that customer can easily check and see they were excluded. So together with all customers checking, this forms a full proof of backing of all crypto assets.
However, obviously customers care about their private information being published. Therefore, a hash of the information can be provided instead. Hash is one-way encryption. The hash allows the customer to validate inclusion (by hashing their own known information), while anyone looking at the list of hashes cannot determine the private information of any other user. All other parts of the scheme remain fully intact. A model like this is in use on the exchange CoinFloor in the UK.
A Merkle tree can provide even greater privacy. Instead of a list of balances, the balances are arranged into a binary tree. A customer starts from their node, and works their way to the top of the tree. For example, they know they have 5 BTC, they plus 1 other customer hold 7 BTC, they plus 2-3 other customers hold 17 BTC, etc... until they reach the root where all the BTC are represented. Thus, there is no way to find the balances of other individual customers aside from one unidentified customer in this case.
Proposals such as this had the backing of leaders in the community including Nic Carter, Greg Maxwell, and Zak Wilcox. Substantial and significant effort started back in 2013, with massive popularity in 2014. But what became of that effort? Very little. Exchange operators continue to refuse to give visibility. Despite the fact this information can often be obtained through trivial blockchain analysis, no Canadian platform has ever provided any wallet addresses publicly. As described by the CEO of Newton "For us to implement some kind of realtime Proof of Reserves solution, which I'm not opposed to, it would have to ... Preserve our users' privacy, as well as our own. Some kind of zero-knowledge proof". Kraken describes here in more detail why they haven't implemented such a scheme. According to professor Eli Ben-Sasson, when he spoke with exchanges, none were interested in implementing Proof of Reserves.
And yet, Kraken's places their reasoning on a page called "Proof of Reserves". More recently, both BitBuy and ShakePay have released reports titled "Proof of Reserves and Security Audit". Both reports contain disclaimers against being audits. Both reports trust the customer list provided by the platform, leaving the open possibility that multiple large accounts could have been excluded from the process. Proof of Reserves is a blockchain validation where customers see the wallets on the blockchain. The report from Kraken is 5 years old, but they leave it described as though it was just done a few weeks ago. And look at what they expect customers to do for validation. When firms represent something being "Proof of Reserve" when it's not, this is like a farmer growing fruit with pesticides and selling it in a farmers market as organic produce - except that these are people's hard-earned life savings at risk here. Platforms are misrepresenting the level of visibility in place and deceiving the public by their misuse of this term. They haven't proven anything.
Fraud isn't a problem that is unique to cryptocurrency. Fraud happens all the time. Enron, WorldCom, Nortel, Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo, Moser Baer, Wirecard, Bre-X, and Nicola are just some of the cases where frauds became large enough to become a big deal (and there are so many countless others). These all happened on 100% reversible assets despite regulations being in place. In many of these cases, the problems happened due to the over-complexity of the financial instruments. For example, Enron had "complex financial statements [which] were confusing to shareholders and analysts", creating "off-balance-sheet vehicles, complex financing structures, and deals so bewildering that few people could understand them". In cryptocurrency, we are often combining complex financial products with complex technologies and verification processes. We are naïve if we think problems like this won't happen. It is awkward and uncomfortable for many people to admit that they don't know how something works. If we want "money of the people" to work, the solutions have to be simple enough that "the people" can understand them, not so confusing that financial professionals and technology experts struggle to use or understand them.
For those who question the extent to which an organization can fool their way into a security consultancy role, HB Gary should be a great example to look at. Prior to trying to out anonymous, HB Gary was being actively hired by multiple US government agencies and others in the private sector (with glowing testimonials). The published articles and hosted professional security conferences. One should also look at this list of data breaches from the past 2 years. Many of them are large corporations, government entities, and technology companies. These are the ones we know about. Undoubtedly, there are many more that we do not know about. If HB Gary hadn't been "outted" by anonymous, would we have known they were insecure? If the same breach had happened outside of the public spotlight, would it even have been reported? Or would HB Gary have just deleted the Twitter posts, brought their site back up, done a couple patches, and kept on operating as though nothing had happened?
In the case of Quadriga, the facts are clear. Despite past experience with platforms such as MapleChange in Canada and others around the world, no guidance or even the most basic of a framework was put in place by regulators. By not clarifying any sort of legal framework, regulators enabled a situation where a platform could be run by former criminal Mike Dhanini/Omar Patryn, and where funds could be held fully unchecked by one person. At the same time, the lack of regulation deterred legitimate entities from running competing platforms and Quadriga was granted a money services business license for multiple years of operation, which gave the firm the appearance of legitimacy. Regulators did little to protect Canadians despite Quadriga failing to file taxes from 2016 onward. The entire administrative team had resigned and this was public knowledge. Many people had suspicions of what was going on, including Ryan Mueller, who forwarded complaints to the authorities. These were ignored, giving Gerald Cotten the opportunity to escape without justice.
There are multiple issues with the SOC II model including the prohibitive cost (you have to find a third party accounting firm and the prices are not even listed publicly on any sites), the requirement of operating for a year (impossible for new platforms), and lack of any public visibility (SOC II are private reports that aren't shared outside the people in suits).
Securities frameworks are expensive. Sarbanes-Oxley is estimated to cost $5.1 million USD/yr for the average Fortune 500 company in the United States. Since "Fortune 500" represents the top 500 companies, that means well over $2.55 billion USD (~$3.4 billion CAD) is going to people in suits. Isn't the problem of trust and verification the exact problem that the blockchain is supposed to solve?
To use Quadriga as justification for why custodians or SOC II or other advanced schemes are needed for platforms is rather silly, when any framework or visibility at all, or even the most basic of storage policies, would have prevented the whole thing. It's just an embarrassment.
We are now seeing regulators take strong action. CoinSquare in Canada with multi-million dollar fines. BitMex from the US, criminal charges and arrests. OkEx, with full disregard of withdrawals and no communication. Who's next?
We have a unique window today where we can solve these problems, and not permanently destroy innovation with unreasonable expectations, but we need to act quickly. This is a unique historic time that will never come again.
How to buy Bitcoin and Deposit on Roobet Full Tutorial
Hello! In this thread I will do my very best to explain how to purchase Bitcoin safely and deposit it onto Roobet.com ! If anything is too confusing or you need further instructions feel free to message a mod for help!Be very aware of other users offering to sell you bitcoin or purchase on your behalf.If you are new to Bitcoin in general I strongly recommend watching this quick video on the basics of bitcoin safety https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2z2xggmeW1AAfter you have watched that or you already understand bitcoin skip to down below! Buying Bitcoin Step 1 Chosing an exchange Ok so you want to buy bitcoin to play on roobet? No problem! Bitcoin is super easy to use once you understand it! The first thing you need to do is pick an exchange to purchase from. I would recommendcoinbaseas it is a very large and trusted exchange.If coinbase does not work in your region then I would recommendBinance The last option if buying online doesn't work would be a local Bitcoin ATM use google to find one close to you. Step 2 Signing up -coinbase Sign up using https://www.coinbase.com/join/carava_zo to get a bonus 10$ btc on your first purchase Once you create an account you will be prompt to verify both a Email & Phone Number *Sometimes a photo id is required* *(It is recommend to add one as it will improve account security and increase your buying limit)* Follow the on screen prompts until you get to Add Payment Method Add your method of payment Once you link a Bank/Credit Card you will now be in the main page https://preview.redd.it/a58hftutv8d51.png?width=1892&format=png&auto=webp&s=9ce87ba198fdcaad10a2da4725c1030fca4d1741
Copy the Bitcoin Address (Your bitcoin address not the one in the screenshot)
Head back to coinbase
You should still have the Sent/Receive tab open if not open it back up
Put in the amount of BTC you wish to send
I like to add a note to keep my purchases organized this is optional
PASTE THE ROOBET DEPOSIT ADDRESS WE COPIED FROM STEP 1
DOUBLE TRIPLE QUADRUPLE CHECK THE ADDRESS IS CORRECT YOU ONLY GET 1 SHOT AT THIS GO SLOW
If everything looks good click send
TRIPLE CHECK BEFORE CLICKING SEND You will be given a confirmation screen again take note of the fees It is easy to get confused especially with currency conversion its always best to look at the BTC amount not the $ amount. (pro tip) Last chance to check everything Once you confirmed everything click send and the BTC is on its way! Go back to roobet and keep an eye on your notifications. Thanks to Roobet Instant funding you only need 1 confirmation before your funds are ready to go! https://preview.redd.it/14x2wwmo59d51.png?width=524&format=png&auto=webp&s=d40212fd1b67555fecb6e7f69c78d47c1abe569f Thats it!!!!You have successfully purchased and added BTC to your roobet account! Things to note Bitcoin is risky be safe take time to learn it Gambling is risky... Crpto is risky this website combines both please take the appropriate steps to ensure not only your financial safety but also your metal health Play Smart Play Safe Thank you for reading!if this helped you at all I would love it if you used my links above when signing up This was my first reddit guide I apologize if it is messy/confusing I will work on the formatting any Feedback is appreciated -Dom
The events of a SIM swap attack (and defense tips)
Posted this on Coinbase and someone recommend it also be posted here. The information below on an attempted SIM swap attack was pieced together through a combination of login and security logs, recovering emails initiated by the attacker that were deleted and then deleted again from the trash folder, and learning from AT&T’s fraud representatives. The majority if this is factual, and we do our best to note where we are speculating or providing a circumstantial suspicion. TLDRs at the bottom. The full story: We were going about our business and received a text from AT&T that says “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” We did not request this, and were suspicious that the text itself could be a phishing scam since we searched the phone number and it wasn’t overtly associated with AT&T. Thus, we tried calling AT&T’s main line at 611 but all we hear is beep beep beep. The phone number is already gone. We use another phone to call AT&T and at the same time start working on our already compromised email. While we didn’t see everything real time, this is what the recovered emails show. In less than 2 minutes after receiving the text from AT&T, there is already an email indicating that the stolen phone number was used to sign into our email account associated with Coinbase. 2 minutes after that, there is an email from Coinbase saying: "We have received your request for password reset from an unverified device. As a security precaution, an e-mail with a reset link will be sent to you in 24 hours. Alternatively, if you would like your password reset to be processed immediately, please submit a request using a verified device. This 24 hour review period is designed to protect your Coinbase account." This is where Coinbase got it right to have a 24 hour review period (actually a recovery period) before allowing the password to be reset. However, the attackers knew this and planned to steal the second email from Coinbase by setting email rules to forward all emails to a burner address and also have any emails containing “coinbase” re-routed so they don’t appear in the Inbox. 5 minutes later, they request a password reset from Gemini and the password was reset to the attacker’s password within a minute after that. The next minute they target and reset DropBox’s password followed immediately with Binance. Less than 2 minutes later, an email from Binance indicates that the password has been reset and another email arrives a minute later indicating a new device has been authorized. It’s at this point that we begin locking the attacker out by (1) removing the phone number as 2FA (2) changing the email password, (3) and three forcing a logout of all sessions from the email. There was a bit of back and forth where they still had an active login and re-added the stolen phone number as 2FA. They added only one more password reset to a gaming account that was not deleted. I can only suspect that was a decoy to make it look like the attack was directed at gaming rather than finances. The Gemini and Binance accounts were empty and effectively abandoned, with no balances and inactive bank accounts (if any), and no transactions in 1-3 years. DropBox had no meaningful files (they probably look for private keys and authenticator backups) and the phone number they stole from us was suspended, so as far as the attacker is concerned, there is no meat on this bone to attack again… unless they had inside information. This is where I suspect someone internal at Coinbase receiving wire deposits has been compromised in tipping off ripe accounts – accounts with new and somewhat large balances. We had completed a full withdrawal of funds from Coinbase earlier in the year, and had a balance of less than $20 heading into May. Deposits to Coinbase staggered in to get above six figures through mid-May then stopped. The attack occurred 7 days after the last large wire deposit was made to Coinbase. From the perspective of an attacker that had no inside information, we were a dead end with abandoned Gemini and Binance accounts with zero balances and stale transactions, no DropBox information, and the suspended phone number access. Our Coinbase deposits were known to no one except us, Coinbase, and our bank. We were also able to stop the hacker’s email forwarding before Coinbase’s 24 hour period to send the password reset, so this one didn’t work out for the attackers and it would make sense for them to move on to the next rather than put efforts into a second attack only for Coinbase - for what would appear to be a zero-balance Coinbase account based on the other stale accounts. Then…23 hours and 42 minutes after the first attack, another message from AT&T “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” Here we go again. We had been confident in AT&T’s assurances that our account had been locked and would not be SIM swapped again, so we unwisely added the phone number back to our email account as a backup (it’s now removed permanently and we use burner emails for account recovery like we should have all along). Upon seeing that our phone number had been stolen again I knew they were after the Coinbase reset email that was delayed by 24 hours from Coinbase as part of their security. We did 4 things within 2 minutes of that text: (1) removed the phone number again from the email account – this time for good, (2) market sell all Bitcoin on Coinbase, (3) withdraw from Coinbase, (4) have AT&T suspend service on the phone line. In speaking with AT&T, they were floored that our SIM would be transferred again in light of all the notes about fraud on the account and the PIN being changed to random digits that had never been used by us before. Based on the response of disbelief from AT&T on the second port, I suspect that this attack also involved a compromised AT&T employee that worked with the attacker to provide timely access to the Coinbase password reset email. Apparently, this has been going on for years: https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/sim-swap-fraud-account-takeove with phone carrier employees swapping SIMs for $80s a swap. Remember that most of this was hidden in real time, and was only known because we were able to recover emails deleted from Trash by the attacker. Since we require any withdrawals to use Google Authenticator on Coinbase, our funds may have been secure nonetheless. However, under the circumstances with attackers that were apparently working with insiders to take our phone number twice in attempts to steal Bitcoin, and it being unknown if they had additional tools related to our Google Authenticator, we decided it was safer on the sidelines. The coins were held on the exchange for a quick exit depending on whether Bitcoin was going to break up or down from $10,000. A hardware wallet is always safest, but we were looking to time the market and not have transaction delays. For some some security recommendations: AT&T: If you are going to send a text saying that calls and texts are moving to a new number, provide a 10 minute window for the phone number to reply with a “NO” or “STOP” to prevent the move. This can escalate the SIM dispute to more trusted employees to determine who actually owns the line. Don’t let entry level employees swap SIMs. Coinbase: Do not default to phone numbers as 2FA. Also, if someone logs in successfully with the password before the 24 hours are up, the password is known and there is no need to send the password reset email again for attacker to have forwarded to them. At least have an option to stop the password reset email from being sent. We did not tag our account at Coinbase with fraud because of the stories of frozen funds once an account is tagged. I’m not sure what the solution is there, but that is another problem. Being a trader, it would be nice to think of Coinbase as any other type of security brokerage where your assets are yours (someone can’t steal your phone number and transfer your stocks to their account). We fell into that mindset of security, yet this experience has reminded us of the uniqueness of cryptocurrency and the lack of custodial assurance and insurance from exchanges because of the possession-is-everything properties of cryptocurrency. As many have said before, 2FA with a phone number quickly becomes 1-factor authentication as soon as that phone number is associated with password recovery on your email or other accounts. Our overall recommendation is to avoid having a phone number associated with any recovery options across all your accounts. TLDR on the process: Scammers will steal your phone number (in our case twice in 24 hours) and use your phone number to access your email and accounts. They will use your email to reset passwords at financial accounts and file hosting such as DropBox. They will then use that combination to transfer any assets they can access from your accounts to theirs. They will do their best to hide this from you by (1) not resetting your email password so as to raise suspicion, (2) immediately delete any password reset emails you may receive from financial accounts to hide them from you, (3) attempt to forward all emails sent to your address to a burner email, and (4) set email rules to forward emails containing “coinbase” to an email folder other than your Inbox so that you don’t see the transactions and password reset emails that arrive to your inbox. TLDR on defense tips: If your phone stops working or you receive a text of your number being ported do the following as soon as possible: (1) log into your email account(s) associated with your financial accounts and remove your phone number as 2FA immediately (2) change your email password, (3) force a logout of all sessions from your email (at this point you have locked them out), then (4) check your mail forwarding settings for forwards to burner addresses, (5) check your mail rules for rerouting of emails from accounts such as Coinbase, and (6) call your carrier to have them suspend service on your lost phone number and ask them to reinstate your SIM or get a new SIM. This will require a second phone because your personal phone number has been stolen. We hope this helps some others be safe out there in protecting their coins. The more we know, the more we can protect ourselves. Wishing you all the best!
The events of a SIM swap attack directed at Coinbase (and defense tips)
The information below on an attempted SIM swap attack was pieced together through a combination of login and security logs, recovering emails initiated by the attacker that were deleted and then deleted again from the trash folder, and learning from AT&T’s fraud representatives. The majority if this is factual, and we do our best to note where we are speculating or providing a circumstantial suspicion. TLDRs at the bottom. The full story: We were going about our business and received a text from AT&T that says “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” We did not request this, and were suspicious that the text itself could be a phishing scam since we searched the phone number and it wasn’t overtly associated with AT&T. Thus, we tried calling AT&T’s main line at 611 but all we hear is beep beep beep. The phone number is already gone. We use another phone to call AT&T and at the same time start working on our already compromised email. While we didn’t see everything real time, this is what the recovered emails show. In less than 2 minutes after receiving the text from AT&T, there is already an email indicating that the stolen phone number was used to sign into our email account associated with Coinbase. 2 minutes after that, there is an email from Coinbase saying: "We have received your request for password reset from an unverified device. As a security precaution, an e-mail with a reset link will be sent to you in 24 hours. Alternatively, if you would like your password reset to be processed immediately, please submit a request using a verified device. This 24 hour review period is designed to protect your Coinbase account." This is where Coinbase got it right to have a 24 hour review period (actually a recovery period) before allowing the password to be reset. However, the attackers knew this and planned to steal the second email from Coinbase by setting email rules to forward all emails to a burner address and also have any emails containing “coinbase” re-routed so they don’t appear in the Inbox. 5 minutes later, they request a password reset from Gemini and the password was reset to the attacker’s password within a minute after that. The next minute they target and reset DropBox’s password followed immediately with Binance. Less than 2 minutes later, an email from Binance indicates that the password has been reset and another email arrives a minute later indicating a new device has been authorized. It’s at this point that we begin locking the attacker out by (1) removing the phone number as 2FA (2) changing the email password, (3) and three forcing a logout of all sessions from the email. There was a bit of back and forth where they still had an active login and re-added the stolen phone number as 2FA. They added only one more password reset to a gaming account that was not deleted. I can only suspect that was a decoy to make it look like the attack was directed at gaming rather than finances. The Gemini and Binance accounts were empty and effectively abandoned, with no balances and inactive bank accounts (if any), and no transactions in 1-3 years. DropBox had no meaningful files (they probably look for private keys and authenticator backups) and the phone number they stole from us was suspended, so as far as the attacker is concerned, there is no meat on this bone to attack again… unless they had inside information. This is where I suspect someone internal at Coinbase receiving wire deposits has been compromised in tipping off ripe accounts – accounts with new and somewhat large balances. We had completed a full withdrawal of funds from Coinbase earlier in the year, and had a balance of less than $20 heading into May. Deposits to Coinbase staggered in to get above six figures through mid-May then stopped. The attack occurred 7 days after the last large wire deposit was made to Coinbase. From the perspective of an attacker that had no inside information, we were a dead end with abandoned Gemini and Binance accounts with zero balances and stale transactions, no DropBox information, and the suspended phone number access. Our Coinbase deposits were known to no one except us, Coinbase, and our bank. We were also able to stop the hacker’s email forwarding before Coinbase’s 24 hour period to send the password reset, so this one didn’t work out for the attackers and it would make sense for them to move on to the next rather than put efforts into a second attack only for Coinbase - for what would appear to be a zero-balance Coinbase account based on the other stale accounts. Then…23 hours and 42 minutes after the first attack, another message from AT&T “…Calls & texts will go to your new phone/SIM card. Call 866-563-4705 if you did not request.” Here we go again. We had been confident in AT&T’s assurances that our account had been locked and would not be SIM swapped again, so we unwisely added the phone number back to our email account as a backup (it’s now removed permanently and we use burner emails for account recovery like we should have all along). Upon seeing that our phone number had been stolen again I knew they were after the Coinbase reset email that was delayed by 24 hours from Coinbase as part of their security. We did 4 things within 2 minutes of that text: (1) removed the phone number again from the email account – this time for good, (2) market sell all Bitcoin on Coinbase, (3) withdraw from Coinbase, (4) have AT&T suspend service on the phone line. In speaking with AT&T, they were floored that our SIM would be transferred again in light of all the notes about fraud on the account and the PIN being changed to random digits that had never been used by us before. Based on the response of disbelief from AT&T on the second port, I suspect that this attack also involved a compromised AT&T employee that worked with the attacker to provide timely access to the Coinbase password reset email. Apparently, this has been going on for years: https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/sim-swap-fraud-account-takeove with phone carrier employees swapping SIMs for $80s a swap. Remember that most of this was hidden in real time, and was only known because we were able to recover emails deleted from Trash by the attacker. Since we require any withdrawals to use Google Authenticator on Coinbase, our funds may have been secure nonetheless. However, under the circumstances with attackers that were apparently working with insiders to take our phone number twice in attempts to steal Bitcoin, and it being unknown if they had additional tools related to our Google Authenticator, we decided it was safer on the sidelines. The coins were held on the exchange for a quick exit depending on whether Bitcoin was going to break up or down from $10,000. A hardware wallet is always safest, but we were looking to time the market and not have transaction delays. For some some security recommendations: AT&T: If you are going to send a text saying that calls and texts are moving to a new number, provide a 10 minute window for the phone number to reply with a “NO” or “STOP” to prevent the move. This can escalate the SIM dispute to more trusted employees to determine who actually owns the line. Don’t let entry level employees swap SIMs. Coinbase: Do not default to phone numbers as 2FA. Also, if someone logs in successfully with the password before the 24 hours are up, the password is known and there is no need to send the password reset email again for attacker to have forwarded to them. At least have an option to stop the password reset email from being sent. We did not tag our account at Coinbase with fraud because of the stories of frozen funds once an account is tagged. I’m not sure what the solution is there, but that is another problem. Being a trader, it would be nice to think of Coinbase as any other type of security brokerage where your assets are yours (someone can’t steal your phone number and transfer your stocks to their account). We fell into that mindset of security, yet this experience has reminded us of the uniqueness of cryptocurrency and the lack of custodial assurance and insurance from exchanges because of the possession-is-everything properties of cryptocurrency. As many have said before, 2FA with a phone number quickly becomes 1-factor authentication as soon as that phone number is associated with password recovery on your email or other accounts. Our overall recommendation is to avoid having a phone number associated with any recovery options across all your accounts. TLDR on the process: Scammers will steal your phone number (in our case twice in 24 hours) and use your phone number to access your email and accounts. They will use your email to reset passwords at financial accounts and file hosting such as DropBox. They will then use that combination to transfer any assets they can access from your accounts to theirs. They will do their best to hide this from you by (1) not resetting your email password so as to raise suspicion, (2) immediately delete any password reset emails you may receive from financial accounts to hide them from you, (3) attempt to forward all emails sent to your address to a burner email, and (4) set email rules to forward emails containing “coinbase” to an email folder other than your Inbox so that you don’t see the transactions and password reset emails that arrive to your inbox. TLDR on defense tips: If your phone stops working or you receive a text of your number being ported do the following as soon as possible: (1) log into your email account(s) associated with your financial accounts and remove your phone number as 2FA immediately (2) change your email password, (3) force a logout of all sessions from your email (at this point you have locked them out), then (4) check your mail forwarding settings for forwards to burner addresses, (5) check your mail rules for rerouting of emails from accounts such as Coinbase, and (6) call your carrier to have them suspend service on your lost phone number and ask them to reinstate your SIM or get a new SIM. This will require a second phone because your personal phone number has been stolen. We hope this helps some others be safe out there in protecting their coins. The more we know, the more we can protect ourselves. Wishing you all the best!
The Undiscovered Facts Behind Money Laundering, Cryptocurrency, and Banks
A week ago, a lot of documents known as the FinCEN documents were delivered, enumerating how the absolute greatest banks on the globe move trillions of dollars in dubious exchanges for suspected psychological militants, kleptocrats, and drug top dogs. Also, the U.S. government has neglected to stop it. https://preview.redd.it/lme57jyyx1r51.jpg?width=1200&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=014ead7b7b812b3d6cbaf4a141eeec123589121b The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), an agency inside the Treasury Department, accused of battling tax evasion, psychological militant financing, and other monetary violations. An assortment of "dubious movement reports" offers a window into budgetary debasement, and how governments can't or reluctant to stop it. Benefits from destructive medication wars, fortunes stole from creating nations, and hard-earned investment funds taken in Ponzi plans, all course through money related establishments, in spite of admonitions from bank workers. These reports are available to US law enforcement agencies and other nations’ financial intelligence operations. Although FinCEN is aware of the money laundering activities, it lacks the authority to stop it. Money laundering is more than a financial crime. It is a tool that makes all other crimes possible - from drug trafficking to political crimes. And banks make it all possible. In a detailed expose, BuzzFeedNews named several of the most trusted banks. Current investigations show that even after fines and prosecutions, well-known JPMorgan Chase JPM (+0.9%), HSBC, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, and Bank of New York Mellon BK (+0.8%) are all involved in moving funds for suspected criminals. The current money related framework generally protects the banks and its heads from the indictment, inasmuch as the bank documents a notification with FinCEN that it might be encouraging crime. The dubious movement alert adequately gives the banks a free pass. Thus, unlawful finances keep on moving through banks into different businesses from oil to amusement to land, further isolating the rich from poor people, while the banks we have developed to trust, make everything conceivable. As indicated by the United Nations, the assessed measure of cash laundered universally in one year is 2 to 5% of the worldwide GDP, or $800 billion to $2 trillion, with more than thank 90% of illegal tax avoidance going undetected today. Simultaneously, the cryptocurrency industry has likewise been condemned for being an apparatus for tax evasion, in spite of insights expressing something else. It is assessed that solitary 1.1% of all digital currency exchanges are illegal. During its initial days, Bitcoin was generally connected with the Silk Road, an online dim net commercial center, where clients could buy weapons and unlawful medications namelessly. Be that as it may, with the developing utilization of the Bitcoin organization, 42 million Bitcoin wallets, and checking, it is getting progressively conceivable to follow exchanges on open blockchains, while private financial exchanges stay covered up on display. This week, I had a chance to plunk down with Chanpeng Zhao "CZ", the Founder and CEO of Binance, the biggest cryptographic money trade by volume on the planet, to get his interpretation of illegal tax avoidance both in the customary and the computerized fund universes. Coming up next are a couple of features from our meeting: Much obliged to you for going along with us today, CZ. As you would see it, for what reason is illegal tax avoidance especially destructive to our economy? CZ: As monetary administration suppliers, it is our obligation to battle unlawful action. Everybody shares this duty. Yet, regularly once the principles are set up, individuals will attempt to get around the guidelines. What's more, there are individuals who simply need more business, and knowing or unconsciously will encourage these exchanges. We live in an intricate world, where one nation may see a go about as criminal and the other may not. Many individuals have a high contrast see, yet the world is really dim. Not all banks are honest and not all crypto organizations are terrible. The digital currency industry has experienced harsh criticism for encouraging unlawful exchanges. How would you think conventional money and digital currency businesses analyze in such manner? CZ: If you are utilizing Bitcoin, it is a straightforward record. When you have a couple of exchanges, you can follow the assets right back to where the coins were mined. So along these lines, blockchain really gives a straightforward record to everybody to dissect. In the event that you piece together a couple of information focuses and do a group examination, it isn't that difficult for a calculation to break down the beginning. Security coins are more earnestly to follow, yet their market top isn't unreasonably high, making bigger exchanges more troublesome. So to be completely forthright, it is a lot simpler to make illegal exchanges utilizing fiat than utilizing crypto. How might you analyze the volume of illegal exchanges in crypto versus fiat? CZ:It's likely a thousand times less. Essentially, for any important measure of cash you need to move in the crypto, it is exceptionally difficult to move it namelessly. There are outsider checking devices and information bases that can coordinate a considerable lot of the addresses to known people. The digital currency market top is little to the point, that in the event that you are moving a $100 million dollars, you can't do as such without experiencing an incorporated trade, making it considerably simpler to follow. The cryptographic money space overall was begun by Satoshi Nakomoto as to some degree a campaign against the defilement of banks. Remarkably, the beginning square of Bitcoin contained a commentary tending to the bailouts of banks in 2008 and 2009 ["The Times 3 January 2009 - Chancellor on edge of second bailout for banks."] Is that ethos still alive in the digital currency space today, the drive to bring down the enormous person? CZ: I have even more a fair view here. Some in the crypto space are against banks, fiat, and so forth., while others think digital forms of money are utilized by drug masters. Those are two extraordinary perspectives. My view is that digital money offers opportunities - a further extent of opportunity in exchanges, ventures, property, reserve funds, and so on. We are simply offering another choice for clients who esteem that opportunity and control. I'm not against any bank or any single individual. I think crypto offers a higher opportunity of cash, and thusly we need to give more individuals admittance to crypto… If I don't care for the banks, I simply don't utilize them. Where do you feel the equalization lies between the legislature securing its residents as opposed to encouraging advancement? CZ: I accept governments ought to be public administrations. They ought to give streets and fire departments...Whenever there is government intercession, it is awful for the economy. At whatever point an administration encourages one gathering, it naturally harms another. The administration influences the parity of the economy giving assistance to a gathering that isn't sufficiently serious to remain alive. So at whatever point an administration rescues huge banks, or any business so far as that is concerned, they just appear as though they are making a difference. I have confidence in a free economy, and I buy into that way of thinking unequivocally. Much obliged to you for your understanding, CZ. More information about PrivateX: www.privatex.io PrivateX is a private wallet for sending, receiving, and storing your Bitcoin and Ethereum. If you are interested in services, contact us [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) #moneylaundering#privatex#buybitcoin24#binance#huobiglobal#kraken#crypto#bitcoin#consulting24#buybitcoin#buybitcoinnow#blockchain#startacompanyinestonia#companyinestonia#estonia#cryptoexchanges#privatexcoin
Brave Browser: TRULY FASTER - The browser that rethinks the web
The Brave browser is very new to the browser scene but they are seriously making a huge thing in the market. Not only promising and insanely fast speed beat out Chrome and Firefox but also security and privacy built in by default for the user. Is this all just hype, is it there is something to it and why most people switch to Brave. https://preview.redd.it/gaodv4set1151.png?width=625&format=png&auto=webp&s=9656fe17369c4389964addd9145822e0acf9bb05 For the record, Brave Rewards, BAT, Brave Ads & anything cryptocurrency related is DISABLED by default. This is a big misconception as these features are OPT IN and completely optional to the user. The browser you currently using loaded with trackers, cookies and other data collection parasites that is constantly following you when you are browsing your browser. What if instead of being used, you were actually rewarded for your regular internet usage. What if you could limit your ads. Wouldn't it makes internet a better place. That's why i use Brave browser. Brave doesn't collect my browsing data in fact my data never leaves my device. Brave shields against Malware, Autoplaying videos, Phishing attempts, Fingerprinting and other malicious attempt to steal and exploit your sensitive information.
Brave is built on Chromium and is an open-source browser project that aims to build a safer, faster and a more stable way for all internet users to experienced the web.
Why BRAVE browser
Load pages 3x to 6x faster Import and continue where you left off Support your favourite sites with Brave Rewards Experience unparalleled privacy and security.
BRAVE browser features
Per-site shield settings
Configurable global shield defaults
Earn by viewing private ads
Tip your favorite creators
Contribute monthly to sites
Auto-contribute to sites
Verify with Uphold and move funds in and out of your wallet
Become a verified creator and start earning BAT from tips, contributions and referrals
Tabs & Windows
Drag and drop*
Find on page
Clear browsing data
Built-in password manager
Control content access to full-screen presentation*
Control site access to autoplay media
Send “Do not track” with browsing requests
Choose default search engine
Use keyboard shortcuts for alternate search engines*
Option to use DuckDuckGo for private window search*
Extensions/Plugins Brave Desktop now supports most of the Chrome extensions in the chrome web store. Address Bar
Search from address bar
Autosuggest search terms
Show/hide bookmarks toolbar*
Show secure or insecure site
How does Brave Rewards work?
Brave Browser users earn tokens by surfing the web.
They tip tokens to you, their favourite content creator.
You sign up as a verified content creator on Brave Rewards.
This is where you can find answers to some of the most frequently asked questions. If you can't find what you are looking for then perhaps try browsing our WIKI, or one of our past AMA Recaps! The "most asked" questions are listed first. These will consistently change to reflect Kava's current landscape.
Relevant Questions (Timely)
When will Kava’s DeFi Lending Platform become available?
Kava’s DeFi Lending Platform will go live on June 10th (pending the approval of the current governance vote)
How/where can I access the new DeFi Lending features
The new features will be accessible via integrated wallet and exchange applications such as Cosmostation, Forbole, Trust Wallet, and Frontier.
When is the first Crypto Payday?
On July 15th, 74,000 KAVA tokens (95k USD as of Jul 2020) will be distributed amongst a pool of USDX minters.
How many “Crypto Paydays” will there be?
There will be a new Crypto Payday every wednesday for an entire calendar year - each Payday pool will be composed of that week's USDX minters.
What does the future hold for Kava's DeFi Lending Platform?
The next step will be to adopt new assets.
The governance group will vote for which asset Kava’s DeFi Lending Platform will support next.
Likely candidates are BTC, XRP, or ATOM.
How do I qualify for Crypto Payday?
Use Kava's DeFi Lending Platform to mint USDX.
Currently USDX can only be minted w/ BNB.
When are Crypto Paydays?
Staring July 15th, 2020
Ending July 16th, 2021
Where can I go to mint BNB?
The new features will be accessible via integrated wallet and exchange applications such as Cosmostation, Forbole, Trust Wallet, and Frontier.
How To Buy Bitcoins FromLocalbitcoins.com How To Buy Bitcoins From Localbitcoins LocalBitcoins is one of the trusted bitcoin trading platforms for peer-to-peer marketplaces. LocalBitcoins accepts over 60 different payment methods. Any individual can buy bitcoin either online or in-person using LocalBitcoins. It seems to be an alternative to major bitcoin exchanges such as Binance and Kraken.
LocalBitcoins puts the amount of bitcoin being sold in escrow.This escrow system, prevents your money from losing once you paid and provides your money, the complete security on bitcoins purchase time. This feature is currently applicable only for the online trades and not allowed for local trades, where you meet someone face-to-face. Most Trusted Payment methods on LocalBitcoins Below listed are various modes of payment on Localbitcoins
Prepaid debit cards
Postal orders etc.,
How To Buy Bitcoin On LocalBitcoins Here’s step by step procedure stated on how to buy bitcoin using LocalBitcoins, they are
Step 1: Open LocalBitcoins website
Initial step open the local bitcoin website, and make sure once that you opened the original website and not the website launched by scammers with the fake version Step 2: Create an Account Go to https://localbitcoins.com/registe You get a free and secure online bitcoin wallet. No additional apps are needed If you already have a LocalBitcoins account, you can skip this step
Step3: Select an advertisement
From the advertisements list choose any one of the traders who have a good reputation score and a high amount of trades. You can also check this from response time indicator shows, it clearly indicates you the status in different colours. Green Colour: If a trader replies within five minutes Yellow Colour: If trader replies within 30 minutes Grey colour: If the trader replies slower than 30 minutes . Additionally you can also click the 'Buy' button to view more information about an advertisement.
Step 4: Choose a payment method
Carefully select any one of the payment methods as listed above and press the buy button
Step 5: Pay the seller
Once you press the 'Buy' button you'll see more information about the advertisement, including the terms of the trade. Read it all carefully before submitting the trade request, if you do not agree to trade with them, then you can go back to the previous page and choose another advertisement. To start the trade, type in the blue box how much you want to buy, enter a message for the seller and click the Send trade request button to start the trade. Be sure you're ready to pay when clicking the button, if you don't pay before the payment window is over, the trade will be automatically cancelled. Step6 : Mark payment complete If you are done on the payment, then click the I have paid button. Once the trader has verified that your payment has been received your Bitcoin will be released from escrow and they are instantly available in your LocalBitcoins wallet. And that's all you can successfully finish your first Bitcoin trade! #bestplacetobuybitcoin #bitcoinaccount #bitcoinlogin #localbitcoinswallet #bitcoinwallet #Bitcoins #Buybitcoin #cryptocurrency #digitalcurrency #paperlesscurrency #paperlessmoney #ethereum #ethereumwallet
Last year Bitfury’s multidisciplinary Blockchain specialists announced the possibility of revealing the identities of more than 16% of all owners of Bitcoin addresses. Several years ago, a team of CryptoLux developers, having conducted a study of transaction privacy on the Bitcoin network, concluded that 60% of all addresses can be deanonymized. Summarizing all this, it’s worth highlighting three existing methods that can successfully deanonymize private transactions.
The easiest way to cluster (link Bitcoin addresses) is by analyzing transactional networks. In other words, this is a method that allows finding several inputs combined in one transaction. The second clustering method is “distribution analysis”. It allows calculation the percentage of cryptocurrency at the certain address that comes from another specific address and it becomes clear whether these addresses are connected by one direct transaction or a chain of transactions or not.
It consists of quantitative and temporal analyzes. Quantitative analysis studies not certain transactions, but amounts. Time analysis tracks specific periods.
Memory Pool Method
When a transaction is made through the user’s wallet, the input nodes send information about the transaction to the Blockchain network. The purpose of this method is to identify the set of input nodes through the wallet and the user. In this case, the IP address of the client can be associated with its transactions. There are certain private cryptocurrency-leaders which are popular and trusted among users. Using one feature-privacy, they have different ways of functioning.
Basic principles of work: anonymous cryptocurrencies (Monero, Dash, Zcash)
The platform focuses on privacy and decentralization. The coin uses three levels of protection: • Ring signatures, that hide the origin of the sender by mixing the user’s address with the addresses of other group members. • Ring confidential transactions, which hide the amount of the transaction. • Stealth addresses, that allow a user to hide the recipient’s address. Such way guarantees the privacy of the sender and the recipient. Monero can be bought on Poloniex, Bitfinex, Livecoin, and Kraken crypto exchanges. It is possible to store Monero via an online wallet. More secure is its computer wallet. Due to its privacy, the popularity of the coin is expected to grow, so it makes sense to add a coin to an investment portfolio. Advantages • Increased privacy. Cryptocurrency is suitable for those who are afraid of deanonymizing network transactions. • Unlimited and difficult mining. • It takes less time to find blocks. • Resistance to the centralization of mining capacities. Disadvantages • Resources. All currency protection technologies require impressive machine performance for normal operation. The Monero block size is constantly growing, and this requires additional resources of network participants. • The popularity in the dark web leads to problems in working with regulatory authorities, exchanges often delist it. Speaking of reputation, Monero’s reputation is far from the best. The coin is often used on the dark web as payment for various illegal services. It happens to almost all crypto coins that provide privacy. • Large transaction sizes. Since Monero Blockchain is five times larger than the Bitcoin Blockchain in terms of one transaction. • Problems with scalability.
The Dash platform is a classic decentralized Blockchain-based payment system and the most technologically advanced cryptocurrency. It implements multi-off-chain money transfers without loss of reliability and overall security of the Blockchain. Its confidentiality is rather an additional option that can be used optionally. In the case of anonymity, it is possible to send a hidden transaction, but at a more expensive cost, which also requires additional time. Dash developed a hashing algorithm with eleven cryptographic functions-X 11 for the first time. The coin developers have released apps for other platforms. Today it is possible to use Dash for IOS, Zeal for Linux, LovelyDocs for Android and Velocity for Windows. As well known, the CoinJoin is an anonymization method for crypto transactions, which is used by Dash as an improved version called the PrivateSend. Its mixing sessions are limited to 1,000 DASH for each session and will require multiple mixing sessions to anonymize a large amount of money. Advantages • High transaction speed. It is achieved via InstantX technology, which enables the confirmation of operations in less than 4 seconds. • Law transaction fees. • Energy consumption. Unlike Monero, it does not require a lot of power or high commission costs. Disadvantages • “Transparency” of the network. Without triggering the “mixing” mechanism, the directions of transactions and their balances are publicly visible to everyone. • Lack of proper cryptographic technologies that provide privacy, but can provide a sufficiently high level of protection. • Transaction visibility to the founders and the team.
An open-source decentralized cryptocurrency that provides users with maximum privacy. Zcash is the first private cryptocurrency, using cryptographic protocol zk-SNARKS, a zero-knowledge security layer. It allows users to make hidden and open transactions. Mathematically guaranteed privacy is something cryptocurrency can not be proud of. This fact makes the currency specific. All Zcash coins are identical, it means that interchangeable coins do not contain information about past use created. In this regard, the connection of coins with their history on the Blockchain is broken, which makes them universal and identical to each other. Zcash blocks are generated 4 times faster than Bitcoin. The currency trades on Huobi, Bitfinex and Binance exchanges, and after purchase, it can be stored on the exchange’s internal wallet, as well as transferred to Jaxx, Cryptonator and Coinomi multi-currency wallets. Coins can also be stored on hardware wallets like Ledger and Trezor. Advantages • Privacy. Since no information except the time stamp, is recorded in the Blockchain, transactions cannot be tracked, and the identity of the sender and recipient is almost impossible to establish. • Interchangeability. Due to interchangeability, all coins have a “clean” history. This means that it is practically impossible to determine which transactions coin was used. • Security. Lack of information about user keys, which protects user wallets and the network.Mining energy efficiency. Zcash mining hardware consumes less electricity than Bitcoin mining ASICs. • The difficulty of mining. Zcash is beneficial for those who want to get coins for block creation. Bitcoin mining becomes more and more complicated, so miners cannot earn enough money via their computers with high capacity. Disadvantages • 6 users can decide to leave the transferred data completely open. • It takes a lot of calculations to complete a transaction. • Insecurity. There are fears that the system could be hacked, or users may accidentally open the data. • Legally ZCash is supported only by Linux, however, it provides users with wallets for other platforms: Jaxx, Ledger, Trezor, Trust, Zecwallet, Ibitcome, Exodus, Guarda, Coinomi, Cobowallet, and Bitgo. Private cryptocurrencies are necessary for anyone who values the privacy and confidentiality of financial transactions. Privacy can generate more value, than danger, as Eric Hughes says: “Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. Privacy is not secrecy. A private matter is something one doesn’t want the whole world to know, but a secret matter is something one doesn’t want anybody to know. Privacy is the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world”.
A HISTORY OF HUOBI Huobi was founded in 2013 by their current CEO and chairman, Leon Li. Li’s background includes having attended Tshingua University, specializing in Automation. Before starting the Huobi Group, Li spent time as a computer engineer at Oracle. In December of 2013, Huobi was named as the largest digital asset exchange operating in China. 2017 saw Huobi extend their limbs into Korea, Singapore, and Japan. Currently, Huobi has headquarters of various financial sectors based in: Singapore; South Korea; Japan; Australia; Indonesia; Russia; Argentina; Thailand; and China. The company has strived to give customers not only a great exchange, but a great resource for any service one may need. Despite the many difficulties faced with Chinese government in regards to cryptocurrency laws, Huobi has managed to adapt to the changes and thrive globally, eventually branching off into various sectors including venture capital, a cryptocurrency wallet project, and a division dedicated to working with mining pools. HUOBI'S PLATFORM spot trading : Huobi offers several different platforms to serve any customer’s needs. For starters, Huobi offers a standard spot trading platform that operates similarly to many other spot trading platforms in the industry. The platform features a multi-timeframe chart, a depth chart, and integration with TradingView (including their tools). Customers are able to view the order book and the asset trading history, as well as their own personal order history. Limit orders, Market orders, and Stop-Limit orders are all available options for traders. margin trading : For the trader that prefers to trade with a little more volume or risk, Huobi offers a Margin trading platform. Customers can apply for loans through Huobi to trade a greater quantity of cryptocurrencies and profit from the price spread. The original loan must be paid back, and accounts can be liquidated if the risk ratio falls below 110% (calculated as: [(Loaned Amount + Tradable Balance) Total Asset] / [(Interest Payable + Loaned Amount)] x 100%.) Traders can margin trade with Bitcoin; Ethereum; XRP; Litecoin; Bitcoin Cash; and EOS. These assets can be traded with USDT or BTC. futures trading : Huobi also offers a Futures trading platform. While margin trading can be risky, trading contracts is said to be very high-risk. With that being said, Huobi offers Weekly, Bi-Weekly, and Quarterly contracts in Bitcoin; Ethereum Classic; Ethereum; EOS; Litecoin; Bitcoin Cash; XRP; TRX; and Bitcoin SV. OTC(P2P) - The OTC, or over-the-counter, section of Huobi offers potential buyers and sellers a way to move large quantities of coins without exposure to the fickle exchange market. Certified merchants can register here, and slippage can be minimized by matching buyers and sellers directly instead of creating market orders. HUOBI APPS While you do have the online trading interface, Huobi does have computer programs and mobile apps that you can use. I found that the PC programmes were more functional as they did not have to rely on the PC browser and were hence much faster. They also have better charting and you are in more control of your trading parameters. These programs are available on Windows and Mac devices. However, if you are a trader that is always on the go, that is where the Huobi mobile apps come in. These were developed for the main exchange but you can switch to the derivative markets on the futures and swaps platform. This was a pretty well designed application and you have one-touch ordering as well as some basic charting functionality. The app is available in iOS and Android and you can head on over to the respective app stores to get a sense of the feedback. EXCHANGE SECURITY Huobi operates a hot and cold wallet storage procedure. This means that they keep the vast amount of their coin holdings in an offline environment away from hackers. They then have a smaller percentage in “hot” wallets with multisig capability. They also operate a decentralized server structure around the world which can ensure uptime irrespective of whether one of the servers goes down. You can think of this as effective load balancing. Finally, they have anti DDoS measures in place. We all know that crypto exchanges are prime targets for Denial of Service attacks and it can be quite frustrating when these are perpetrated in peak market times. IS HUOBI TRUSTWORTHY? Huobi, like many exchanges in the space, has had, at one time, some shady history, but for the most part, has managed to maintain a clean reputation. Historically, Chinese exchanges have shown to operate in accordance with different standards, with many exchanges having to suffer at the will and whim of the Chinese government. Some of the controversy Huobi has seen in the past has been a result of this (particularly with the Chinese ban on ICO tokens). It should be noted that in 2017, the exchange did invest into “wealth-management products” using idle customer funds. This sort of activity shouldn’t be taken lightly. However, with that being said, the exchange continues to turn over a large amount of volume. For the most part, the exchange can be considered a trustworthy platform to trade popular and exotic cryptocurrencies. This does not mean it is entirely safe to store user funds on the exchange, as the exchange (or the user funds) can be susceptible to risk at any given moment. No matter how comfortable one may be with the internet, one should always remember that the internet is not as safe as many would like to believe. Huobi does have measures in place in the unfortunate event that an account is breached, and if verifiable, the customer may be able to retrieve lost funds. A unique feature offered on Huobi is their Official Media Authenticator. This essentially lets users enter the URL of a content channel to see if the channel is authentic. A feature like this, while seemingly simple, could save anyone from potentially losing their funds due to a scam or phishing website. HUOBI REVIEW VERDICT Huobi Global offers a signficant host of features to its users and has maintained its credibility over a long period of time. This is largely one of the main reasons it a ranked as a top 4 exchange by liquidity as its users trust their funds there. After establishing itself in Asia, Huobi is trying to branch out and take on other areas of the globe which is great news for Western traders. Additionally, the Huobi prime platform could provide some great opportunities for the exchange users moving forward. Huobi Website: https://www.huobi.com/topic/invited/?invite_code=q7g23 Huobi Indian Community: https://t.me/huobiglobalindia Huobi Global Community: https://t.me/huobiglobalofficial
Bitcoin Isn't Meant For Conventional Westphalianism (Republicanism)(Statism)
Let me give you an idea of the vantage point and perspective I come from. I *am a quant, and a trader, and someone well read in law* I hate wallstreet, because I understand how the western economy works, and obviously I understand the technicals of trading and quant work. So I know the angles they play. And I understand regulatory behavior, I have a background in environmental regulatory work ( left because it's corrupt no surprise). You people obsessed with price at any cost or calling everything FUD have no long term view of things. If we get a economic collapse, a real crash, *the happening*, Bitcoin is going into the hundreds again. At this point, bitcoin is dependent on wallstreet, dependent on the same economy we supposedly disagree with. They've written the laws in the united state to only benefit the rich and institutions, and banned us off almost all exchanges. The only thing americans can use are basically three major names with piss poor liquidity and catastrophic fees. No one even talks about this. You HAVE to trade on unregulated exchanges to get by. Losing binance was a massive loss. The rich and powerful in united states have plans for bitcoin totally antithetical to cypherpunk. We don't just need mainstream adoption, we need mainstream adoption of bitcoin WITH mainstream adoption of things like bisq and wasabi. This needs to become the norm, and yet they instead are planning on geofence locking bitcoin on a system of white listed exchanges, institutions, and wallets, trapping and tagging kyced bitcoin. The thing people have to realize is that the money laundering that is done, is done through Deutsche bank and HSBC and the likes, by the drug cartels, human right violating dictators, war criminals , shell companies for defense companies and spin offs of intelligence agencies. It's all done with cash and the us dollar and banks. The worst people who run the super PAC for election, the worse people who hold trillions offshore and dominate the third world with multinational corporations, Russian oligarchs, all of them use the system and its loop holes to do all the things that they are trying cite as a reason to impose on bitcoin all of these extreme regulations. They want secrecy for themselves. Period. They want to control and oppress us, and use secrecy for themselves. Most of the reason western governments are broken is because of multinational conglomerate and monopolistic economic cartels buying out regulatory agencies. Period. It's called a inverted totalitarianism. (From Lawerence Lessig's Lost Republic). The economic cartels own the regulatory agencies. No regulatory body in the united states does what it really should do. But more often the opposite, specifically to protect industry, and their trillions offshore. The people who have all this wealth and control these profit entities don't even keep the money in the states or pay taxes. The truly rich live above the law while wrecking democracy. They want to have the ability to do the worst possible shit with the same level of secrecy that monero implies. So not only do we need encryption and privacy coins and features and anonymous untraceable access to bitcoin just to protect ourselves from them, we need to empower ourselves by having the same level of financial access that they do. Think about it. What is the effect of the rich institutions making so many loopholes that allow them to move money and participate in functions of the market that the average person is prohibited from? It encourages and enables their ability to subvert democracy secretly with the very financial crimes they accuse of us. So we need to take very deadly serious interchains and DAPP and DEX and DEFI, the wasabis, the mixers, monero, commerce adoption, and INFRASTRUCTURE that supports it. You people acting like maximalist can be so dense FFS. OPSEC. The world doesn't need bitcoin full node on backdoored windows 10 with zuck and the nsa watching you take a shit. The hardware and ancillary gear and infrastructure that supports bitcoin matters. Linux matters, user interface matters, commerce acceptance matters, server technology and security matters, even the processor matters, there are IBM and RISC V chips now,. The internet and bitcoin along with it needs to be violently dragged into open source models. Corporatization and closed gardening and the mcdonaldification of bitcoin is going to end in tragedy. Bitcoin really is intended to be an anarchist apparatus. Bullshit to the citadel loving maximalist power tripping on some sort of libertarian randian american centric fantasy. You need to pay attention to why democracy doesn't work, why our political systems are broken, why these aspects of government only seem to empower the worst aspect of wallstreet criminality and financial crisis. Because it's how a late republic behaves, it's inherent in the flaws of republicanism, in electoral politics, in these hierarchical regulatory bodies, which are in no way self governing. Our regulatory bodies are the literal opposite of Don't trust, Verify but more Don't verify, Trust.
Enjin wallet is one of the most credible wallets in the crypto space that supports Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, ERC20 tokens, and Enjin tokens. It has one of the best architecture, with a secure keyboard, two encryption, where it turns the mobile wallet like a hardware wallet. Enjin is an HD (Hierarchical Deterministic) wallet, that provides the maximum amount of protection from threats and ... Dabei muss man wissen, dass sich der Preis für den Bitcoin dort ausschließlich auf der Grundlage von Angebot und Nachfrage ergeben. Es kann sich also durchaus lohnen, hier ein Bitcoin Konto zu eröffnen. Binance. Binance ist eine Handelsplattform für Kryptowährungen, die die wichtigsten und großen Kryptowährungen abdeckt. Hier wären ... Binance provides easy and convenient ways for you to buy Bitcoin instantly, and we put our best efforts to fully inform our users about each and every cryptocurrency we offer on the exchange, but we are not responsible for the results that may arise from your Bitcoin purchase. This page and any information in it is not meant to be interpreted as an endorsement of any particular cryptocurrency ... Download fast and secure Binance Coin (BNB) wallet with built-in cryptocurrency exchange. Manage, buy and swap 500+ cryptos in one secure interface. 6. Copay – A Multisig Bitcoin Desktop Wallet. Platforms: Mac OS, Linux, and Windows. Copay is a wallet created by BitPay, one of the largest Bitcoin payment service providers around. The wallet is available for most major platforms (mobile and desktop) and is a multisig wallet. Copay is another secure open source multisig wallet (multisig means it requires multiple signatures for a bitcoin transaction). One of its most intriguing selling points is its ability to hold multiple bitcoin storages. You can manage shared funds with friends, family and coworkers. 7000 Bitcoins von Kryptogeldbörse Binance gestohlen Über kompromittierte Nutzeraccounts bei der Kryptogeld-Börse Binance sollen Unbekannte Bitcoin im Wert von rund 36 Millionen Euro geklaut haben. Supported cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin, and over 50 others. Jaxx is another popular secure Bitcoin wallet. Part of Jaxx’s popularity stems from the vast range of cryptocurrency token support found in a single software wallet, allowing users to manage large portfolios from a single location. Ledger is among the most secure Binance Coin wallets in the industry as it implements a variety of security protocols and cryptographic procedures, and all your coins are stored offline. The service supports a large variety of coins and tokens, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Stratis, Dash, Zcash, Dogecoin, Litecoin, Ripple, Monero and, of course, Binance Coin. Source ... Exodus is available on Mac, Linux, and Windows. Update: ... Though this guide is for making a Bitcoin paper wallet, it will still help you make a paper wallet for Litecoin (it’s the same process). 7 Best Litecoin Wallets. Litecoin is almost 8 years old in the crypto world. It initially had slow growth, but after Charlie Lee’s return as a full developer, and also SegWit activation, Litecoin ...
Trust Wallet & Binance - The Future of Storage Today I discuss trust wallet & their integration with binance. The wallet will function with their DEX & allow... If you aren't prepared to trust a single software wallet, or are simply sweeping a high value Bitcoin paper wallet, it is worth knowing how to do it securely by using your phone and your PC to ... Trust Wallet & Binance - The Future of Storage - Duration: ... TRUST WALLET - Secure Multi Coins Wallet - Duration: 5:22. Syndicator Official 10,319 views. 5:22. How to Buy Cryptocurrency for ... Luno helps you buy Bitcoin and Ethereum in three easy steps: 1. Sign Up here - https://www.luno.com/invite/Y9UKZ - Sign up for a free Luno Wallet on web, iOS... Top 5 Best Cryptocurrency Wallets You'll receive $10 in free bitcoin by signing up with this link http://bit.ly/2oesV41 Bitcoin & Etherum Storage Wallet: htt... Watch this video to find out my thoughts on The Safest/Best Places to Store Your Cryptocurrency! Like. Subscribe. Follow us on Twitter at: https://twitter.co... I’m not sure if calling this a hack is appropriate or even correct, which is why I have gone with a factual episode title. We won’t know the full story until they complete the security audit ... Kostenloses & Sicheres Bitcoin Wallet - Electrum - https://electrum.org/ 🐃 Bitcoin & Co. einfach kaufen (inkl. 10€ Bonus) https://talerbox.com/go/bison/?ut... How to store your Bitcoin, Ethereum, Binance coin, and ERC20? SafePal S1 is your new partner! The most secure & easy-to-use hardware wallet in the world. Considering the fact that many existing ...